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Do or should Americans have a right to health care o r some appro­
priate level of it? To explore this difficult and complex question, we 
must say something about rights and ways to justify them; about 
considerations which favor a right to health care; about what level 
and kind of care the right may involve; and about what can be said 
against such a right. We believe that a right to a decent level of health 
care should be recognized and enacted in public policy.
RIGHTS
Health Care as a Claim Right
To say that people have a right to have or do something implies that 
whether they have it or not, o r do it o r not, is their choice; it is up to 
them. They have a legitimate and strong claim to choose to have o r to 
do. Some rights are best described as “liberties.” A person may choose 
to do something, but others do not necessarily have to allow him or 
her to do it. For example, a basketball player is “at liberty” to score a 
basket but the opponent does not have to perm it this. O ther rights— 
those we will focus on—are stronger; they are not mere liberties but 
are claim rights. This means that if a person has such a right, others 
have a correlative obligation o r duty not to interfere. When a 
basketball player is awarded a foul shot, those on the opposing team 
may not try to block it—they have a duty to let the player shoot. O ur 
most im portant legal and constitutional rights are claim rights. I 
have a right to free speech, which means that neither private parties 
nor the government may stop my speech.
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Health Care as a Positive Right :
The right to health care we have in mind, then, is a claim right, a right 
which is also the basis o f duties in others. What are the duties? To 
answer this, we must distinguish between negative and positive 
rights. A right is a negative right when the correlative duties of others 
are duties of noninterference only. Thus my right of free speech is a 
negative right if the only duty others have with respect to that right is 
to not interfere with my attempts to speak, to leave me alone to speak 
as I choose. It is not difficult to respect negative rights. All one has to 
do is leave other people alone and mind one’s own business. Negative 
rights—to life, to liberty, to the acquisition o f property—have histor­
ically played a large role in the American political tradition.
Positive rights, on the other hand, require more than noninter­
ference. They require aid; they require that one help others obtain 
what they have a right to. My right to life is a negative right if not 
killing me is all that others must do to respect it. But if they must 
come to my aid when I am in danger o f dying, by providing or paying 
to provide needed health care, then my right is a positive right. 
Positive rights are sometimes called welfare rights, for they involve 
positive contributions to the welfare of others. It is not enough 
simply to leave people alone; one must also help them when they are 
unable to help themselves.
The social enforcement o f both negative and positive rights is 
expensive, but that o f positive rights is usually more expensive. To 
protect an individual’s negative rights, for example, to free speech or 
security of property, a police force, courts, and prisons are required 
to deter those who would invade these rights. It is also important for 
the state to restrain its own tendency to violate negative rights. All 
this is not cheap, as we know from the cost of the judiciary and the 
correction system. But though expensive, negative rights are less 
costly to maintain than positive rights, which require both programs 
to provide the help mandated by the right and agencies to administer 
these programs. Since such programs and agencies are funded from 
tax revenues, they are in reality transfer payments from those who 
have much to those with little. For this reason, such programs and the 
positive rights they secure are less popular in the United States than 
negative rights and the judicial institutions they require.
It is safe to say that the right to health care as a negative right is 
recognized in this country as part of one’s general right to liberty. If 
you choose to seek medical help and have the money or insurance to
pay for it, no one may stop you. The curren t issue has to do with 
health care as a positive right—not only something which people can 
claim as their due but something which society must provide to those 
unable to secure it by themselves. The obligation of citizens correla­
tive to this right is that they provide the tax revenues to fund the 
needed programs. It is this right and set of correlative obligations 
that we will examine.
Health Care as an Inherent Moral Right
Before concluding this discussion of the nature of rights, it is 
im portant that we distinguish legal from moral rights. A right is a 
legal right when it exists as a m atter of law and is enforced by the 
judicial authorities. A right is a moral right when it exists as a m atter 
of moral principle, when moral reflection and argum entation are the 
grounds for its validity. A society may fail to give legal recognition to 
moral rights, as happens in regimes which either deny or do not 
protect what are generally accepted to be basic hum an rights. When 
we argue for a right to health care, we are arguing both for health care 
as a moral right and for its recognition as a legal right.
W ithin the dom ain of legally recognized rights one can distin­
guish those rights which exist p rior to policies which secure them, 
and those which are the creatures of and dependent on policy. 
Suppose that a policy is thought desirable and enacted into law—for 
example, the practice of allowing elderly persons to pay only half-fare 
for public transportation. Once this law is enacted, senior citizens 
have a valid legal entitlem ent, a legal right, to pay half-fare for travel. 
There is, however, no fundam ental moral right which existed p rio r to 
the enactm ent of the policy that made its passage morally mandatory. 
The policy is “a good idea,” a desirable way to prom ote the common 
good, but not a m andatory demand of justice. The right is therefore 
the effect of the policy and comes into being only when it is enacted. 
Such a right is a conventional right.
Consider, on the o ther hand, a right to nondiscrim ination in 
matters of public education. Brown v. Board of Education recognized 
and secured this right, but it seems reasonable to propose that the 
right preceded Brown. It existed not solely as a result of the policy or 
practice Brown announced but as the basic reason for that legal 
decision. Let’s call such legal rights, which are based on prior moral 
right, inherent rights. The right to health care we wish to defend is an 
inherent right.
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Rights and Self-Respect
O ur final general point about rights is that when one has a right to 
something, one can “stand up and dem and it as one’s due.” One need 
not beg for it o r convince others of its desirability on a case-by-case 
basis. Receiving the aid to which one has a right is a different thing 
from receiving aid that has been gratuitously offered as a m atter of 
charity. For this reason, it has been suggested that having rights is 
im portantly connected with self-respect and social status.1 To be a 
rights-holder with regard to certain things is to have a social recogni­
tion which prom otes one’s sense of worth and equality with others. A 
right is thus desirable not only for what is received through its 
exercise but also for its fu rther effects on securing respect and status.
JUSTIFYING RIGHTS ' -
Claims that people have certain rights require justification. Rights 
have typically been justified three different ways. The first holds that 
certain rights are natural and self-evident—basic propositions whose 
tru th  everyone is compelled to adm it and which require no fu rther 
defense. The Declaration of Independence invokes such a view when 
it holds as “self-evident” the truths “that all men are created equal 
[and] endowed by their creator with . .. inalienable rights” to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The problem  writh claims to self­
evidence is that people may differ in what they accept as self-evident, 
and this view provides no grounds for adjudicating among conflict­
ing claims. Further, and more im portant, there must surely be some 
reasons why certain things are legitimately dem anded as rights and 
others are not. But this view is silent here.
The second theory remedies this by basing the recognition of 
rights on their tendency to prom ote general hum an well-being. On 
this utilitarian basis, rights are not simply self-evident bu t are justified 
by their consequences, their results. Since rights to health care meet 
urgent hum an needs, there is reason to think that the recognition of 
such rights might well be utility-maximizing. But there is a well- 
known problem  of appeals to utility which weakens this argum enta­
tive ground. U tilitarian justification relies on the total quantity of 
hum an happiness or welfare that a particular system or policy 
produces, and it chooses that alternative which produces the greatest
'For a discussion of this idea, see Joel Feinberg, “The Nature and Value of Rights,”
Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (1970): 243-57. .
total amount. The net happiness of each person is added together to 
achieve a sum total; it is this sum which plays the justificatory role. 
Utilitarianism is thus not directly concerned with the distribution of 
welfare among people. The distribution matters only insofar as it 
affects the general total. A system of unequal rights could receive 
utilitarian preference over equal rights if the improved welfare of 
those with greater rights under the system outweighs the losses of 
those with lesser rights such that the total benefit is greater than what 
a system of equality produces. To defend a right of equal access to 
health care, the utilitarian perspective is inadequate.
The third perspective is, unlike utilitarianism , inherently distrib­
utive. Its basic idea is that there are certain individual human 
interests which are of such fundam ental im portance to the ability to 
lead a decent life that each and every individual person should be able 
to satisfy those interests. This distributive perspective involves four 
elements, as follows:
1. First is the claim that people have fundam ental interests such 
as the need for food, shelter, and clothing.
2. Second is the claim that it is a good and desirable thing that 
people are able to satisfy these fundam ental interests. People are 
happier and lead better lives when they can do so, and it is difficult to 
deny that this is better than the frustration of such interests.2
3. Third is the idea that i f  anyone is able to have these interests met, all 
should be able to do so. This is an explicitly egalitarian premise, 
requiring that such interests be satisfied for each and every person, if 
they are satisfied for any. This differentiates this view from u tilitari­
anism in requiring the satisfaction of the interests and well-being of 
each and every individual, not the highest sum total. It is concerned 
with the hum an welfare of each, not the general welfare of all.
4. Fourth, there is the idea that the only way to secure each and 
every one’s fundam ental interests is by attribu ting  to individuals both 
moral and legal rights to the satisfaction of those interests and/or to 
the means necessary for their satisfaction. To accept these interests as 
rights makes their satisfaction a m atter of particular moral urgency. 
Such fundam ental interests need special defense against two strong 
opponents: the reality of the social and economic system, which 
results in some people being unable to satisfy these interests through
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fundamental interests.
their own efforts, and the legislative enactm ent of social and eco­
nomic policies that prom ote the general welfare at the expense of the 
poor—for example, by cutting taxes to prom ote the well-being o f the 
middle classes and the affluent at the expense of social services for 
those unable to afford them. A socially recognized claim of right 
counters both tendencies. It underlies a dem and that society act 
positively to correct the vagaries of economic fortune and directs 
legislation to give priority to the fundam ental interests of the least 
fortunate.3
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE AS A RIGHT TO AN , 
ADEQUATE LEVEL OF CARE
While using this scheme to justify a right to health care, we want to 
make clear that the right to health care we wish to defend and put on 
a secure basis is not the right to any care anybody might want bu t a 
right to an adequate or basic or decent level of care. Many people in our 
society are unable to secure even this level of care.4 How has this come 
about? Historically, physicians have been a prim ary source of health 
care, and in the past were able and willing to meet the need for health 
care as a positive right by directly providing uncom pensated care to 
those unable to pay for it. This was, and in many cases still is, a well- 
accepted and widely practiced obligation of the medical profession. 
The delivery of health care, however, has changed dramatically 
during the past thirty years, and physicians are no longer the sole 
caregivers. Physicians personally account for only 20 percent of 
actual care delivery. The remainder, although to varying degrees 
directed by o r influenced by physicians, is actually delivered by 
hospitals, nursing homes, extended-care facilities, home health agen­
cies, and a m ultitude of o ther health care organizations and individ­
uals. In many instances, the care delivered by these o ther entities is 
directed o r influenced by third-party payers (insurance, business, 
and government) as much as by physicians, o r even more so.
Along with the shift in control of health care from physicians to 
third-party organizations has come a corresponding change in the 
perception of physicians and o ther health care professionals about
•'This way of seeing rights and justice as giving special emphasis to the needs of the 
least fortunate is firmly defended by John Rawls in his well-known work A Theory ofjustice 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
'For a chilling description of this, see “Health Problems of Inner City Poor Reach 
Crisis Point,” New York Times, December 24, 1990. - , ■ . • •
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their profession(s) and their professional ethics. Many physicians 
have accepted the premise that health care is a business. Medicine is 
now operated as a business by large health care corporations m an­
aged by highly paid adm inistrators (many of whom are also physi­
cians), and by solo- o r small group-practice physicians/small busi­
nessmen. The ethics of medicine require that “a physician shall be 
dedicated to providing com petent medical service with compassion 
and respect for hum an dignity.”5 The ethics of business are less 
grounded in respect for hum an dignity and more concerned with 
financial survival and success.
This poses a difficulty, in that physicians appropriately recognize 
that guaranteeing a positive right to health care imposes a specific 
obligation to be sure that care is provided. When the question then 
arises concerning on whom the obligation falls to provide that care, 
the answer is m uddled because both practical and financial limits 
preclude physicians from providing it all, and the “business” m an­
agers of health care delivery can provide it only as long as their ability 
to generate profits and continue operations is not threatened. The 
best way out of this dilemma is a societal consensus that the obliga­
tion to provide the degree of health care for which there is a right 
should be borne by society in general, including physicians and 
health care managers, through funding by the government.
But how much health care should government underw rite for all? 
Given the ever-inherent lim itation of financial resources, for ex­
ample, it is difficult to say that everyone should have an equal right to 
every expensive health technologic procedure, such as an organ 
transplant o r magnetic resonance imaging scans, when by so doing 
the resources used in those cases would then not be available to 
provide more basic o r less costly care to a greater num ber of people. 
The resolution of this problem  is that there should be an “adequate 
level” or “basic level” of health care to which everyone has a right. 
Health care services which exceed this basic level would then be 
distributed as they currently are, on the negative-rights basis that 
those who are able to afford o r provide additional services for 
themselves will purchase them.
How should this basic level of care be defined? There have been 
many attem pts by interested groups to provide such a definition. 
These range in scope and underlying motivations from the “ideal” 
defined in the Organizational C harter of the World Health Organiza­
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tion, through the Minimum Benefits Plan recently adopted by the 
American Medical Association (a m a ) , which defines the maximum 
am ount of worthwhile services that can be funded with a set amount 
of per-capita expenditures.6 They include also the Basic Benefits 
Package outlined with perhaps the most broadly based input by the 
Health Policy Agenda for the American People;7 and perhaps the 
most controversial, the plan currently being developed by the state of 
Oregon to distribute Medicaid funds more equitably.8
Another possible way to define a basic level of care might be to 
agree that society has a responsibility to provide needed care to all 
members of society, and then prioritize and define the need by 
establishing specific criteria with which to match this responsibility 
with available lim ited resources. Criteria for provision would in a 
sense be society’s definition of who are most in need of societal 
resources, and thus who (or what services) would represent a less 
urgent use of those resources. The criteria might also be agreed- 
upon equivalent needs. The criteria could be many potential factors. 
Age or potential longevity could be used, for example, basing deci­
sions on the presum ed length of life prolonged in an individual case 
per unit o f resource spent. Various attem pts have been made to 
quantify these factors under such terminology as “Quality-Adjusted 
Life Years.”0
An adequate level of health care might also be defined as that 
which can maximize individual well-being and opportunity  to the 
extent that available resources would allow. Relative individual and 
societal benefits of the health care service could be incorporated 
(that is, greater weight placed on immunizations, which benefit the 
individual and. the society in general). Such a definition does not limit 
choices to all needed care, o r all available care but would allow7 
flexibility. W hat is considered “adequate” could change as additional 
knowledge develops concerning outcomes o r opportunity, o r as 
societal resources available for health care change. The underlying
hAmerican Medical Association Board of Trustees, AMA’s Minimum, Benefits Plan, 
Report Y (Chicago: American Medical Association, June 1990).
’Health Policy Agenda for the American People, Basic Benefits Package. Ad Hoc 
Committee on Basic Benefits (Governor Scott M. Matheson, Chair), June 1988.
*“Oregon Puts Bold Health Plan on Ice," Science 249 (1990): 468-71.
!J. LaPuma and E. F. Lawlor, “Quality-adjusted Life Years: Ethical Implications for 
Physicians and Policy Makers,” Journal of the American Medical Association (hereafter JAMA) 
263 (1990): 2917-21.
consensus that an adequate level of health care should be provided 
would still remain.
We want to reemphasize that we do not wish to define exactly 
what an appropriate “adequate” level of health care should be. Quite 
the contrary, since much of the debate and effort which has histori­
cally tried to do so has thus far only impaired the development of a 
consensus that any level of health care is an inherent right. The 
attitudes of many segments of society (or their representatives) have 
instead been that unless a basic am ount of health care can be defined 
and agreed upon in advance, they are not willing to accept the 
responsibility for providing it. We thus reemphasize that our goal is 
to justify that the inherent right to health care exists. If society can 
agree that a right to health care exists, then the tone of the ongoing 
debate changes significantly. It is no longer necessary to struggle with 
defining specifically that one health care service is a right and 
another is not (in an endless succession of such services) before being 
able to agree that there is a right to any such service. Rather, the 
debate can more appropriately and likely more effectively focus on 
determ ining whether a particular service improves individual (or 
societal) well-being or opportunity, and thus can be considered 
within the overall health care framework as part of “adequate” care. 
In the case of expensive technology, the debate can also focus on 
whether the potential for individual well-being o r opportunity  p ro­
vided by the service or procedure justifies the expense enough to be 
considered adequate, or does it, in fact, fall into a realm of “heroic” 
care. These debates would also be able to change with changing 
resources and knowledge, while still focusing on whether, consider­
ing that change in resource or knowledge, the health care item 
should still be “adequate” o r not.
Similar uncertainties about an adequate level of provision have 
characterized the public education system without disturbing the 
consensus which has long existed that education is a fundamental 
right which society has the obligation to provide for all its members. 
In actual practice, the am ount of public education provided, and the 
identification of which members of society it will be provided for, 
have varied (and continue to do so) in response to societal resources 
and to changing interpretations of need. Most states currently agree 
that public education must be provided to all children from first 
through twelfth grades. Some also include kindergarten, based both 
on a societal recognition of its im portance and on available
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resources. In the early years of ou r country’s history, secondary 
education was not felt to be as necessary a right, and thus was not 
always provided at taxpayers’ expense. It has only been in recent 
decades that the “righ t” to an adequate level of education has been 
extended to the developmentally o r physically disabled segments of 
our society, through federal statutes developed by consensus as 
societal attitudes and resources change. Some states have even recog­
nized a societal responsibility to provide higher education by allow­
ing tuition-free college attendance for in-state residents, as Cali­
fornia did through the 1970s. Many states still recognize that 
responsibility by having lower tuition levels for state residents attend­
ing state-supported colleges and universities; but as societal re­
sources have diminished, even in-state residents have had to assume 
some of the financial burden.
Nevertheless, throughout all these changes in scope, the funda­
mental consensus has always remained: society has an obligation to 
provide an education for its members. Few will argue against this 
premise, although debate will always continue on what the curren t 
level of provision for that obligation should be.
JUSTIFYING A RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF 
HEALTH CARE
We retu rn  now to an attem pt to justify a right to a basic level o f care, 
using the “distributive/utilitarian” scheme discussed earlier. There 
are strong and persuasive argum ents favoring the right to a basic level 
of care which we believe are generally accepted and not highly 
controversial. Objections to the right to health care tend to be based 
on counterargum ents; that is, they do not reject the arguments 
favoring the right, but hold, instead, that there are reasons against it 
which are stronger and m ore weighty. We will therefore dwell only 
briefly on the reasons favoring such a right and spend the bulk of our 
time refuting the m ajor counterargum ents.
The first strand of our framework for justifying rights involves 
the claim that people have certain interests whose satisfaction is 
necessary for them  to lead minimally good lives. Defining such 
interests can be done “subjectively,” by identifying interests whose 
satisfaction is necessary for people to reach a tolerable level of 
happiness o r contentm ent. O r it can be done “objectively” by ref­
erence to what an ideal of the good life [or lives] for hum ans re­
quires.10 In either case, it is likely that life itself, adequate nutrition, 
shelter, the minimizing of pain and suffering, and self-determ ination 
will all be considered elements of the good life. Health care thus also 
becomes an elem ent of the good life, since it is an essential means to 
achieve o r maintain these basic interests. Briefly, health care does or 
can do the following: save life, restore complete health, bring a 
person to as healthy a state as is physically possible, prevent ill health, 
relieve pain, suffering, and distress, restore o r secure opportunities, 
and provide inform ation necessary for exercising informed choice." 
All these things meet fundam ental interests and so it makes sense to 
think that health care will be an urgent good in any plausible theory 
of the good life. O f course, not all health care meets such urgent 
needs. Some forms of therapy, such as some cosmetic surgery, satisfy 
wants, not needs. That does not vitiate the case for the urgency of 
much health care. It simply again emphasizes that we must better 
distinguish what health care can do and secure a right to that 
“adequate” level of care which meets the most urgent or accepted 
needs.
Given that health care meets such essential interests, it is also 
clear—in accord with the second strand of our framework—that 
widening access to health care will prom ote the general welfare. But 
we argue that access to adequate care should be provided to all as a 
m atter of right. This requires appeal to the egalitarian distributive 
premise that people should be treated equally with regard to basic 
health care. Every individual should be able to secure an adequate 
level of care. Although a full-scale defense o f this egalitarian claim is 
beyond the scope of this essay, we point out that equality is a deeply 
held value in ou r political system. Although it can mean different 
things, surely most would agree that with respect to the means 
necessary for meeting our most urgent interests, inequality is accept­
able only if there are morally im portant differences between people 
that justify the inequality. The most familiar and persuasive reason 
for inequality is that people merit o r deserve different goods on the
Health Care in a National Health Program 201
l0For an astute discussion of these alternatives, see T. M. Scanlon, “Preference and 
U rgencyJournal of Philosophy, 72 (1975): 655-69.
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basis of positive personal achievements or on the basis of wrongs they 
have intentionally committed. Thus, high salaries may be rational­
ized on the basis of superior social contributions, and punishm ents 
on the basis of voluntary criminal acts. But surely, with regard to basic 
health care, the inability of the bulk of those who are unable to secure 
it by their own efforts is no fault of their own. They have not com m itted a 
crime or been otherwise irresponsible in such a way that they are no 
longer deserving of health care. They are simply poor. Thus, the most 
plausible grounds for inequality do not apply here, and justice seems 
to demand universal access to this basic good. It seems plausible, 
further, that the only way such access can be secured is by a legally 
recognized right to a basic level of care.1-
Much of what we have argued may seem obvious. But, if so, why is 
a right to a basic level of care resisted as much as it is in this country? 
We suggest three reasons for the popular resistance to such a right. 
The first is a concern about government inefficiency. If government is 
authorized to secure basic care for all, it will do this inefficiently and 
ineffectively. Government bureaucracies will grow and red tape will 
multiply. Tax money will be wasted. Better not to recognize a right to 
basic health care than increase government ineptitude. These claims, 
it must be said, are empirical claims, claims about the facts. They may 
or may not be true and they may be more true in some contexts then 
in others. They do not vitiate the idea of a universal right to basic 
health care, but they warn us of the difficulty of developing effective 
institutions to secure that right. But the right survives this critique.
We would also argue that the economic costs of not providing 
adequate health care may already be a greater burden on society than 
the costs of providing such care. Evidence is continuing to accum u­
late, for example, that infants and children are paying a large part of 
the hum an costs for inadequate health care. Newborns who are 
uninsured are more likely to be of low b irth  weight and malnourished 
than those who are insured and are consequently more likely to have 
such adverse outcomes as prolonged hospital stays (including stays in 
intensive care units), transfer to specialized facilities, and deaths.” If 
the poor and uninsured child is able to overcome or survive its 
increased likelihood of perinatal morbidity and mortality, it still
uSee the final paragraph of the section “Justifying Rights,” above, for reasons why 
this interest needs to be recognized as a right.
1SP. Braveman et al. “Adverse Outcomes and Lack of Health Insurance among 
Newborns in an Eight-County area of California, 1982 to 1986,” New England Journal of 
Medicine (hereafter NEJM) 321 (1989): 508-13. ^
must face an increased risk for childhood trauma, accidental poison­
ings, tuberculosis, learning disability, mental illness and alcoholism, 
nutritional deficiency, lead poisoning, anemia, and o ther chronic
Many of these problems will require ongoing, acute care as the 
child grows to adulthood, not just in the health care area specifically 
but also in education o r o ther social systems. More im portant, when 
one recognizes that nearly 40 percent of the estimated thirty to 
thirty-seven million uninsured Americans are children, the eco­
nomic consequences of diminished o r lost productivity over life­
times of lost opportunity  become tremendous. We suggest that the 
investment early on in adequate health care will pay returns in later 
years of improved productivity in the overall society, which more 
than justifies the initial economic commitments.
The second and perhaps most fundam ental reason for resistance 
to a right to a basic level of care rests on the individualism inherent in 
American political culture. A right to health care for all can be 
secured only by transfer payments from some groups to others 
through taxation. But to many, this transfer violates people’s basic 
property rights, rights to earn what they can through their own 
efforts and to use what they earn as they please. This objection, then, 
is on the grounds of liberty. Those who are taxed to provide access to 
care for others are having their freedom  violated, a freedom which 
must take precedence over the equality dem anded by an equal right 
to care. This libertarian-type argum ent is, we believe, very persuasive 
to many Americans who resist a right to a basic level of care; it is a
One response to this argum ent is that the appeal to equality in 
favor of such a right is more im portant than the liberty it takes away. 
But this raises the complex question of the worth of liberty versus 
that of equality, a question we cannot adequately address here. A 
more direct objection is, however, possible. A law that prohibits 
people from doing something imposes a restriction on their liberty. If 
this restriction is unjustified, there is a violation of liberty. Not all 
restrictions are violations. In most countries, for example, driving on 
the left side of the road is not perm itted. This is a restriction that few 
would see as a violation. Even those most zealous about liberty agree 
that many o ther restrictions are not violations; for example, restric­
tions against injury, force, fraud, and theft do not violate liberty.
"D. M. Berwich and H. H. Hiatt, “Who Pays?” (Editorial), NEJM 321 (1989): 541-42.
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W hether a restriction is a violation depends on whether the restric­
tion is reasonable. The contention that transfer payments to under­
write health care for those who cannot provide it for themselves is a 
violation of liberty, as opposed to a reasonable restriction of it, 
requires argum ent. Merely saying that such redistribution violates 
liberty is not providing an adequate argum ent.15 On the surface, it 
does not seem unreasonable to restrict the ability of the members of a 
society to use their earned income on things they want but do not 
need in order to fulfill the basic and urgent needs of those too poor to 
do so for themselves. The appeal to liberty per se does not refute the 
claim that this is a reasonable and ju st social aim.
One may respond, however, by arguing that the reasonableness of 
such a transfer does not show that it is morally required or perm is­
sible. A rich person will not act unreasonably if he or she donates half 
of his o r her wealth to a charitable cause, but it does not appear that 
he or she, morally, must do so. Analogously, it might be reasonable and 
nice if those who can afford basic health care provide it (through 
taxes) for those who cannot, but must they do so? This question—and 
its implied negative answer—makes sense only on the assum ption 
that people have a strong claim to their own income, so that transfer­
ring some part o f it to others is morally problematic. People are 
typically taken to have this strong claim because they have earned 
their income through their own efforts, through hard work and the 
development and effective use o f their talents. In o ther words, people 
are responsible for their abilities and therefore deserve the rewards 
they bring; and this desert, furtherm ore, is the basis o f their right not 
to have their wealth “taken” (or even “stolen”) to help others, unless 
there is a morally weighty reason to do so, such as the protection of 
everyone’s security.
This picture o f hum an endeavor raises very complex and funda­
mental issues of political theory which we cannot do justice to in this 
space. We simply point out that the picture is problem atic because of 
the highly individualistic idea that people can claim sole responsibil­
ity for their efforts and abilities, and thus sole title to the reward these 
bring. In contrast, an individual’s success is often highly dependent 
on their comm unity and its structure of social and economic institu­
tions. A person could not “strike it rich” through his o r her develop-
^Readers familiar with Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic 
Books, 1974), will rightfully see this criticism as directed at a libertarian theory such as 
his.
m ent and use of talents were it not for the willingness of others to 
cooperate in the legal, economic, and social institutions which make 
such rewards possible. Furtherm ore, one’s ability to develop his or 
her talents depends a good deal on educational support heavily 
subsidized by the public, and often on family and social circum ­
stances over which a person has had no control. There are also 
elements of sheer luck frequently involved in how one fares. One is 
born with the capacity to develop certain talents and not others, and 
over this one has no choice. Further, and more im portant for our 
argum ent, whether one’s talents will be rewarded in the society one 
happens to be born into is also a m atter of chance—frail economic 
entrepreneurs, for example, would probably not be at the head of the 
pack in Homeric Greece. And, last but not least, our tastes and values, 
thoughts and preferences, aims and efforts, are heavily influenced by 
our society. We are social and in terdependent members of com m uni­
ties, heavily dependent on the restraint and efforts of others for our 
own well-being and social and economic position. From this perspec­
tive the idea that much of what we earn results from good fortune 
and is best used to meet the most basic needs of those in our 
community who have lost out in this lottery is compelling. Americans 
may well resist recognizing a right to health care because they resist 
this community perspective, but in our view, interdependence can­
not be justly denied, nor can the implication that justice requires 
ensuring that everyone’s basic needs are met through universal access 
to health care.
The third reason for resistance to a right to health care has to do 
with an im portant feature of positive rights. Negative rights can be 
respected by leaving people alone. But positive rights require provid­
ing people with some good. In a m arket economy, however, the typical 
way people come to possess most goods is through earning income 
through work and buying them. The recognition of a positive right, 
then, implies giving people certain goods for free. With regard to 
health care, it means that everyone should be given such care without 
having to do anything by way of labor to earn it. That this goes against 
the American grain is obvious. And that is why negative rights are so 
much more respectable. They do not mean giving people things they 
have not earned but simply leaving them alone.
This understanding of positive rights, however, is mistaken. Sup­
pose we wanted to guarantee everyone a decent standard of living. 
The most efficient and natural way to do this would be to have a set of 
social and economic institutions in which everyone has an oppo rtu ­
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nity to get a job  and earn enough income to live up to that standard. 
In o ther words, we can ensure people’s positive rights by making it 
possible for them  to earn the wherewithal they need if only they 
choose to put in a reasonable e f f o r t .T h e  problem  occurs when 
those institutions fail to provide every individual with that opportu ­
nity. Then some people, through no fault of their own, cannot 
provide for themselves. It is in this case and only in this case that 
concern for positive rights m andates help. So respect for positive 
rights does not mean giving people “something for nothing.” It 
means helping those who need help because they cannot help 
themselves. It means, in o ther words, benevolence and being a good 
Samaritan. W hat we might call the “free-riding” objection is unper­
suasive.
THE C O N S T I T U T I O N A L  STATUS OF A RIGHT  
TO HEALTH CARE .
At the time of the drafting o f the United States Constitution, and 
during most of the two centuries since, there has been neither a legal 
nor constitutional presum ption that a right to a m inim um  level of 
health care services exists. Such a right has not been considered to be 
an inherent right, and thus is not part of the seventeenth-century 
political and legal philosophy on which the United States Constitu­
tion was based.
One of the widespread movements to establish a nationwide 
health care system occurred in the mid-1960s. During this time, 
much discussion was devoted to the concept of a right to a minimal 
level of health care services, which ultimately led to the establishment 
of the Medicare program  to provide health care for the elderly, and 
the Medicaid program  to provide health care to the poor. Despite 
that progress, however, there has been very little in the way of 
litigation o r court action which would address the concept of a legal 
right o r a constitutional right to a minimal level of health care, even to 
the curren t time.
The justices of the Supreme Court have held in two separate cases 
that state and federal legislatures are not obligated to fund abortion 
services for indigent or poor women.17 These rulings support current
'*This is argued by James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1987).
17Maher v. Roe, 432 US. 464, 1977; Harris v. McRae, 448 US. 297 (1980).
federal law, which denies Medicaid funding to states for abortion 
services except in the case of a life-threatening pregnancy.18 In an 
additional decision of the Supreme Court, however, Justice Thur- 
good Marshall made the observation that access to medical care of a 
nonemergency nature was a basic necessity of life for the poor, 
equivalent to general welfare assistance.19
These decisions served as the foundation for perhaps the most 
im portant case heard by the Supreme Court; in that case the plain­
tiffs forced a direct examination of the issue of a basic entitlem ent to 
health care services by bringing suit against a county government 
under federal civil rights statutes. A patient had experienced severe 
abdominal pain during her fourth m onth of pregnancy. She con­
tacted her physician, who instructed her to meet him at the hospital. 
The patient then dialed the emergency num ber for ambulance 
service (provided by the county) and was taken by the ambulance to 
another hospital, where the county had a contractual arrangement, 
despite her protestations that she needed to see her own physician at 
her own hospital. At the hospital where she was taken, there was a 
long delay before she was seen. After finally being evaluated, she was 
then transferred to the original hospital where her prim ary physi­
cian was still waiting for her, but by this time it was essentially too late. 
She was well into prem ature labor and subsequently delivered a 
stillborn prem ature infant.
The woman’s attorneys argued that the patient had a constitu­
tional right to medical services provided by her own physician at her 
own hospital, and the county had interfered with that right by taking 
her to a different hospital. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit ultimately ruled, with extensive background 
justification, that municipalities have no constitutional obligation to 
provide even the most basic protective services; not only health care, 
but also police, fire protection, and sanitation. The only exception 
seen by the Court of Appeals occurs when the municipality has 
entered into a “special relationship” with the person or persons 
involved, which results in that person being placed under a substan­
tial degree of forced confinem ent or in custody of the municipality. 
Thus, this case established that persons who are injail or prison, or in 
police custody in a courthouse or a hospital, are guaranteed basic 
levels of health care. Everyone else is not. The key element defined by
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the court was w hether o r not there is present “the exercise of 
coercion, dom inion, or restraint.”20
Two o ther special groups must be recognized; no legal o r consti­
tutional precedent for their right to health care exists, but there 
appears to be substantial societal consensus that they do or should 
have such a right. These two groups are military-service veterans, for 
whom there is a nationwide system of health care, and pregnant 
females and infants. In the ongoing discussions concerning the 
establishment or existence of a right to health care, consideration of 
a constitutional am endm ent to guarantee such a right must be made. 
There is precedent for this in constitutions of o ther Western hem i­
sphere nations.21 Such an action would surely serve as a means to 
focus societal consensus to determ ine if there is indeed agreement 
over whether this right truly exists. If successful, such an am endm ent 
would then again focus the debate (now through court in terp reta­
tions) on what specifically should constitute “adequate” health care.
C O N C L U S I O N  ■ ■■'■■■ " '
The shift over the last three decades from medicine as a profession, 
controlled and practiced by physicians, to medicine as a business, 
controlled by businessmen (many of whom are also physicians), 
insurers, and government, has been accompanied by a m ajor change 
in how medical care is delivered, in how that care is paid for, and in 
who may have access to that care. It has also been accom panied by a 
rapidly increasing reliance on high-cost technology, which then 
generates fu rther expectations and costs by allowing less room for 
hum an fallibility in delivering care.
Unfortunately, there is little sympathy or flexibility within a 
business and high-technology framework for the poor and the disad­
vantaged. A growing segment of our society have thus been denied 
access not only to the high-cost health care system but to even a mini­
mal level of care. We have argued that it is time for us as a society to 
recognize that a right to basic health care exists and that society has an 
obligation to secure that right. We must refocus our debate not on 
whether health care should be provided to all society members but 
rather on what the adequate level of health care should be and how we 
can prioritize our needs and our resources to provide that level of care.
Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hospital, In/:., 826 F 2d 1030 (1987). >
21W. J. Curran, “The Constitutional Right to Health Care,” NEJM 320 (1989): 788-89.
